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ABSTRACT 
Concurrent fault detection plays a vital role in hardware implementation in order to prevent losing the original message This 
paper explores the new low-cost fault detection scheme for the S-box/ InvS-box of AES using a parity prediction technique. 
The predicted block was divided into seven blocks, to compare between the actual parity output and the predicted parity 
output results in the error indication flag for the corresponding block. The predicted blocks were developed with formulations 
compatible with the new S-box/ InvS-box simulated using 130nm CMOS technology, in Mentor Graphic environment. This 
proposed fault detection has achieved the total error coverage of about 99%. The total area implementation for the fault 
detection predicted parity block of the S-box/ InvS-box required 49 XORs, six XNORs, nine ANDs, one inverter, two ORs 
and one NAND gate. The proposed fault detection has the low hardware complexities which lead to a low cost and low power 
design. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Different countermeasures against fault attacks in 
Advanced Encryption System (AES) have been developed  
(Yen and Wu, 2006) and (Jemima Anlet, 2012). A fault 
detection scheme is chosen not only based on the reliability 
and capability of the scheme, but also on the optimal 
hardware complexity and critical path delay. There are 
various techniques for fault detection of the AES hardware 
implementation. The first technique is based on various 
forms of redundancy, either time or hardware, using the 
decryption module to decrypt the encrypted data and then 
comparing the result with the original plaintext, as proposed 
in (Yen and Wu, 2006) and (Karri et al., 2002).  This 
technique has the drawback of large area, power and delay 
overheads is used where algorithm-level, operation-level 
and round-level fault detection for the AES are applied. In 
(Bertoni et al., 2003), fault detection is presented using 
look-up table (LUT) implementation, which requires more 
memory cells to generate the predicted parity bit. 
Error detection code (EDC) is another fault 
detection technique which makes use of a comparison 
between the predicted parity outputs of a block from the 
input data, with the actual parity from computation of the 
output data of the block. This technique offers an efficient 
and low area hardware with high fault detection. Parity code 
error detection is a well-known EDC with a number of 
parity bits capable of detecting all single bit errors and 
multiple bit errors, with an odd number of errors. The 
output parity bits of each transformation are predicted from 
the inputs using the prediction boxes and compared with the 
actual parities using the actual block.  
The only non-linear transformation in AES is the 
S-box, so most of the EDC methods apply on it. A 
concurrent fault detection scheme proposed in (Bousselam 
et al., 2010), applies to the joint S-box and inverse S-box. 
Concurrent error detection uses a double parity bit for each 
S-box in (Mozaffari and Arash, 2006) one parity bit for the 
input byte, and one parity bit for the output byte, then both 
parities are compared to check the correctness of the S-box. 
In (Di Natale et al., 2007), (Satoh et al., 2008) and 
(Mozaffari and Arash, 2011), the composite fields of the S-
box/InvS-box are divided into sub-blocks and parity 
predictions. The composite field S-box in (Di Natale et al., 
2007) is divided into five partition blocks, and the predicted 
parity bit of each block is compared with the actual parity to 
obtain the error indication flag of the corresponding block. 
Double parity bit method have been enhanced as proposed 
in (Mozaffari and Arash, 2007), by combining the designs 
in (Mozaffari and Arash, 2006)  and (Bousselam et al., 
2010). The predicted input parity bit is compared with the 
actual input parity of each S-box, and the indication error 
flag is obtained by OR-ing the 16 indication flags from each 
S-box. They also modified the double parity bit method in 
(Bertoni et al., 2003), by adding detection logic after 
ShiftRows transformation, in order to detect the error within 
the S-box and ShiftRows transformation. 
 This paper explores the new low-cost fault 
detection scheme for the S-box/ InvS-box of AES using a 
parity prediction based method, by enhancing the scheme in 
(Di Natale et al., 2007) for better protection.  The S-box/ 
InvS-box architecture is developed using a composite field 
algorithm to achieve low area hardware.  
 
NEW FAULT DETECTION SCHEME FOR AES S-
BOX/ INVS-BOX ARCHITECTURE 
 
AES S-box/ InvS-box architecture 
The proposed fault detection is presented using the 
new low-power and low-area S-box/ InvS-box architecture 
based on a compact composite field, using a polynomial 
basis. The transformation of the S-box uses an irreducible 
polynomial of p(x) = x8+x4+x3+x+1 to construct the binary 
field, GF(28).  It consists of multiplicative inversion, 
followed by an affine transformation.  
This new S-box/ InvS-box merges the sub-
component of the typical multiplicative inverse, using a 
circuit minimisation technique to optimise and reduce the 
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hardware complexity of the circuit consists of Stage 1, the 
inversion and the combination of multiplication in GF(24). 
Stage 1 includes a logic optimisation of multiplication in 
GF(24), multiplication with constant, squaring in GF(24), 
and addition included in one circuit. CombineXAXB is 
minimised for multiplication in GF(24) after multiplicative 
inversion in GF(24). The implementation of differential 
blocks and predicted parities are obtained by using the best 
choice of φ = {10}2 and λ={1000}2 to obtain the low area 
and critical path delay.  The new architecture as shown in 
Figure 1 reduces the gate count compared to a typical 
circuit using typical composite field architecture.  
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Figure 1: New S-box/ InvS-box architecture 
New proposed fault detection scheme architecture 
The fault detection scheme has been developed by 
comparing the actual parity output, and predicted parity 
output results in the error indication flag for the 
corresponding block. The architecture of S-box and inverse 
S-box have been divided into seven blocks that cover each 
sub-structure inside it, with seven predicted parities. Seven 
error indication flags are observed, and for zero error 
computation, the output of flags should be zero when 
compared with the actual parities. The predicted parity is 
obtained using the input of each block, while the actual 
parity is obtained from the output of each block. XOR gate 
implementation is utilized to compare the two parity outputs 
and to obtain the fault indication flag. We optimized the 
logic area complexity for each of the predicted parity units, 
to cover all faults, in every output of the S-box/ InvS-box. 
Each block of the S-Box is modified in order to detect all 
single faults leading to an odd number of errors in the 
output.  
Figure 2 illustrates the block diagram of the 
proposed parity prediction fault detection blocks, for the 
composite field S-box and InvS-box. Blocks 1 and 6 cover 
the fault detection for isomorphic and inverse isomorphic, 
while blocks 2 and 7 consist of affine and inverse affine 
predicted parity. Blocks 3, 4 and 5 were developed to 
implement the fault detection for multiplicative inversion 
transformation, consisting of Stage 1, inversion in GF(24), 
and multiplication in GF(24) (CombineXAXB). 
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Figure 2: Proposed parity prediction fault detection blocks 
for the composite field S-box and InvS-box 
 
Sub-block of Fault Detection Scheme  
A. Blocks 1 and 6: Predicted Parity of Isomorphic and 
Inverse Isomorphic Mapping 
Blocks 1 and 6 represent the isomorphic and 
inverse isomorphic mapping based on φ = {10}2 and λ= 
{1000}2, for the best optimum logic implementation to 
obtain the low area and critical path delay.  
 
Lemma 1: Let ς = {ς
7
ς
6
ς
5
ς
4
ς
3
ς
2
ς
1
ς
0
} be the 
input of isomorphic mapping in GF(24) and Γ ={Γ 7Γ 6Γ 5Γ 4Γ 3Γ 2Γ 1Γ 0} be the input of predicted 
parities of isomorphic mapping.  The derivation for the 
predicted parities of block 1, ρiso is as follows:  
                              𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = ς
0
+ ς
1
+ ς
2
+ ς
5
      (1)
        
The total number of XOR gates needed for implementation 
of block 1, 𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 in the S-Box/ InvS-box is three XOR gates 
illustrated in Figure 3.  
 
 
XORς0
ς1
ρiso = XORXORς2
ς5
ρiso
 
Figure 3: Predicted Parity of Isomorphic Mapping 
Lemma 2: Let Λ = {Λ 7Λ 6Λ 5Λ 4Λ 3Λ 2Λ 1Λ 0} be 
the input of inverse isomorphic mapping in GF(24), and 
Γ ′ = {Γ ′7 Γ ′6 Γ ′5 Γ ′4 Γ ′3 Γ ′2 Γ ′1 Γ ′0} be the input of 
the predicted parity of inverse isomorphic mapping.   
 
The predicted parity of block 6,  𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is obtained as 
follows:                      𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = Λ 0 + Λ 2 + Λ 6 + Λ 7                 (2)
                     
XORΛ0
Λ2
ρinviso = XORXORΛ6
Λ7
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Figure 4: Predicted parity of of Inverse Isomorphic 
Mapping 
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Figure 4 shows the hardware implementation complexity 
for the predicted parities of block 6, 𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 consists of three 
XOR gates. 
B. Block 3: Parity Stage 1 
Block 3 of the S-Box/InvS-box implements Stage 
1 architecture, which consists of multiplication in GF(24), 
multiplication with lambda, squaring in GF(24) and a 
modulo-2 addition process based on composite field 
arithmetic.  
The predicted parity of block 3, Pstage1 as follows: 
 
Lemma 3: Let the input of Stage 1 be 𝑤𝑤 = {𝑤𝑤3 𝑤𝑤2 𝑤𝑤1 𝑤𝑤0}R2 
and 𝑞𝑞 = {𝑞𝑞3 𝑞𝑞2 𝑞𝑞1 𝑞𝑞0}R2, while 𝛾𝛾 = {𝛾𝛾3 𝛾𝛾2 𝛾𝛾1 𝛾𝛾0}R2 is the 
input of the predicted parity of Stage 1. The predicted parity 
of block 3, 𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠1 as follows: 
 
𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠1 = (𝑤𝑤0 ∪ (𝑞𝑞0 + 𝑞𝑞1 + 𝑞𝑞2 + 𝑞𝑞3)) + 𝑤𝑤1(𝑞𝑞0 + 𝑞𝑞2)                          + 𝑤𝑤2(𝑞𝑞0 + 𝑞𝑞1 + 𝑞𝑞3) + 𝑤𝑤3(𝑞𝑞0 + 𝑞𝑞2 + 𝑞𝑞3���)   (3)                                                                                                                                              
                                                                                                                                          
where ∪ represents the OR operation. 
 
The hardware implementation of the predicted parity for 
block 3 requires seven XOR gates, three AND gates, one 
OR gate, and one inverter gate, as shown in Figure 5. 
XORq0
ρstage1 = XORXORq2
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Figure 5: Predicted parity for Stage 1 implementation 
 
C. Block 4: Parity Inversion 
Lemma 4: Let the input of the inversion in GF(24) be 
𝛾𝛾 = {𝛾𝛾3 𝛾𝛾2 𝛾𝛾1 𝛾𝛾0}R2 and 𝛳𝛳 = {𝛳𝛳3 𝛳𝛳2 𝛳𝛳1 𝛳𝛳0}R2 is the input for 
the predicted parity of the inversion. The derivations of the 
predicted parity inversion, ρ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  are obtained as 
follows: 
                       ρ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛾𝛾0(𝛾𝛾2𝛾𝛾1�������) + 𝛾𝛾3(𝛾𝛾0 + 𝛾𝛾1)      (4)
           
 
XNORy2
y1
ρinversion =
XORy0
NOT
AND
y3
AND
XOR
ρinversion
 
Figure 6: Predicted parity for inversion in GF(24) 
implementation 
Figure 6 illustrates the hardware implementation for the 
predicted parity of inversion, which utilizes two XOR gates, 
two AND gates, one NAND gate and one inverter. 
 
D. Block 5: Parity CombineXAXB 
Block 5 consists of two multiplications in GF(24), 
after the multiplicative inverse of nibble in GF(24). The 
architecture is optimised using a Boolean simplification 
technique in order to achieve a low gate count.  
 
Lemma 5: Let 𝛳𝛳 = {𝛳𝛳3 𝛳𝛳2 𝛳𝛳1 𝛳𝛳0}R2, 𝑚𝑚 = {𝑚𝑚3 𝑚𝑚2 𝑚𝑚1 𝑚𝑚0}R2 
and 𝑞𝑞 = {𝑞𝑞3 𝑞𝑞2 𝑞𝑞1 𝑞𝑞0}R2 be the input of CombineXAXB, 
while 𝛬𝛬 = {𝛬𝛬7 𝛬𝛬6 𝛬𝛬5 𝛬𝛬4 𝛬𝛬3 𝛬𝛬2 𝛬𝛬1 𝛬𝛬0}R2 is the input for the 
predicted parity of CombineXAXB. The derivation of the 
the predicted parity is: 
 
ρ𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 = (𝛹𝛹 + 𝛳𝛳3)(𝑞𝑞3 + 𝑚𝑚3) + (£ + 𝛳𝛳0)(𝑞𝑞2 + 𝑚𝑚2) +                         𝛹𝛹(𝑞𝑞1 + 𝑚𝑚1) + €(𝑞𝑞0 + 𝑚𝑚0)       (4)                     
                                                                                                                                 
where 𝛹𝛹 = 𝛳𝛳2 + 𝛳𝛳0, £ = 𝛳𝛳1 + 𝛳𝛳3 and € = 𝛹𝛹 + £ 
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Figure 7: Predicted parity of CombineXAXB 
implementation 
The number of gates required for implementing the 
predicted parity of block 5, ρ𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶  is 15 XOR gates and four 
AND gates, as shown in Figure 7. 
E. Blocks 2 and 7: Parity Affine and Inverse Affine 
Lemma 6: Let Γ ′ = {Γ ′7 Γ ′6 Γ ′5 Γ ′4Γ ′3 Γ ′2Γ ′1 Γ ′0} 
be the input of affine in GF(24).  The derivation for the 
predicted parities of block 2 is as follows:  
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ρ𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠 = 𝑐𝑐 + 𝑏𝑏������� + 𝑏𝑏 + 𝑒𝑒 + Γ ′6���������������� + 𝑎𝑎 + 𝑑𝑑 + Γ ′1����������������                               +𝑑𝑑 + 𝑐𝑐������� + 𝑏𝑏 + 𝑒𝑒 + 𝑑𝑑                                    (5) 
where  
𝑎𝑎 = Γ ′4 + Γ ′5, 𝑐𝑐 = 𝑎𝑎 + Γ ′6, 𝑏𝑏 = Γ ′0 + Γ ′7,  
𝑑𝑑 = Γ ′2 + Γ ′3 and 𝑒𝑒 = Γ ′1 + Γ ′5   
XORΓ’0
Γ’1
Γ’2
Γ’3
Γ’4
Γ’5
Γ’6
Γ’7
XOR
XOR
XOR
XOR
XOR
XOR XNOR
XNOR
XOR
XNOR
XOR
XOR
XNOR
XOR
XOR
ρaffine =
ρaffine
 
Figure 8: Predicted parity circuit of affine implementation 
Hardware implementation for the predicted parity of block 
2, 𝜌𝜌𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠 requires 12 XOR gates and four XNOR gates, as 
shown in Figure 8. 
 
Lemma 7: Let the input of the inverse affine beΓ ={Γ 7Γ 6Γ 5Γ 4Γ 3Γ 2Γ 1Γ 0}. The predicted parity of 
Stage 1 is derived as follows: 
 
𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠 = 𝛤𝛤2 + 𝛤𝛤5 + 𝛤𝛤7��������������� + 𝛤𝛤1 + 𝛤𝛤4 + 𝛤𝛤7��������������� + 𝛤𝛤0 + 𝛤𝛤3 + 𝛤𝛤6 +
𝛤𝛤7          (6)
                                                              
The number of gates needed for implementing the 
predicted parity of block 7, 𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠  shown in Figure 9 is 
seven XOR gates and two XNOR gates. 
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XNOR
XOR
XOR
XNOR
XOR
XOR
XOR
XOR
XOR
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Figure 9: Predicted parity circuit of inverse affine 
implementation 
 
DISCUSSIONS 
The total area implementation for the fault 
detection predicted parity block of the S-box/ InvS-box 
required 49 XORs, six XNORs, nine ANDs, one inverter, 
two ORs and one NAND gate. Table 1 summarises the 
hardware complexities for each of the predicted parities for 
blocks 1-  7. Table 2 shows a comparison of the total 
hardware complexities between the proposed predicted 
parity and S-box/ Inv S-box with design of (Kermani and 
Masoleh, 2011).  Design of (Kermani and Masoleh, 2011) 
only for S-box and their predicted parity architecture with 
the same φ = {10}2 and λ= {1000}2 as the proposed design.  
According to the table, the proposed fault detection scheme 
achieves the lowest core area through the circuit level 
optimization. 
Table 1: Hardware complexities for proposed predicted 
parity of S-box/ InvS-box 
 
Table 2: Comparison of total hardware complexities for 
different predicted parity of S-box/ InvS-box 
 
Architecture Area of 
S-box/ 
Inv S-
box 
Area of 
parity 
prediction 
Total area 
of S-box/ 
Inv S-box 
and parity 
prediction 
Mozaffari and 
Arash, 2011 
*only S-box 
122X + 
36A  
42X + 9A 
+ 3O + 1I 
164X + 45A 
+ 3O +1I 
Proposed 105X + 
38A + 
3N + 1O 
49X + 9A 
+ 2O 
+6XN +1I 
154X + 47A 
+ 3N + 3O + 
6XN + 1I  
X = XOR, A = AND, O = OR, I = NOT, N = NAND, XN = XNOR  
 
The proposed fault detection scheme was 
simulated using 130nm CMOS technology, in the Mentor 
Graphic environment. The evaluation for single stuck-at 
errors was carried out to evaluate the fault coverage of the 
proposed fault detection. 
The actual parities for each block of the S-box/ 
InvS-box required an XOR gate to obtain the output parity, 
to compare with the predicted parity. Furthermore, seven 
XOR gates are needed to obtain the indication flag, by 
comparing seven of the predicted blocks with the actual 
parities. All possible single stuck-at errors were inserted 
randomly on the input and output nodes of the logic gates of 
the S-box. Fifty data inputs for the S-box/InvS-box were 
selected and the correct input of each block was replaced by 
an erroneous value, corresponding to a stuck-at fault at an 
input line of each block.  The output error is detected by 
comparing the parity bit with the actual parity of the 
outputs. All the single faults will result in single errors in an 
odd number of erroneous bits at its output, and all the 
possible faults are detected by parity checking at each of the 
blocks and ends of the S-box/ InvS-box block. 
The proposed fault detection was also injected with 
multiple stuck-at errors, whereby 50 nodes were made 
faulty for a multiple fault. This simulation proves that the 
predicted parity fault detection has almost 100% fault 
coverage at the byte level. For a single stuck-at error, it 
shows that the faults are covered 99.9 % for both entire 
Block XOR XNOR AND INV OR NAND 
1, 𝝆𝝆𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 3 - - - - - 
2, 𝝆𝝆𝑠𝑠𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒊𝒊𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇 12 4 - - - - 
3, 𝝆𝝆𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝒇𝒇𝑺𝑺 7 - 3 1 1  
4, 𝝆𝝆𝒊𝒊𝒇𝒇𝒊𝒊𝒇𝒇𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒇𝒇 2 - 2 - 1 1 
5, 𝝆𝝆𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪 15 - 4 - - - 
6, 𝝆𝝆𝒊𝒊𝒇𝒇𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 3 - - - - - 
7, 𝝆𝝆𝒊𝒊𝒇𝒇𝒊𝒊𝑺𝑺𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒊𝒊𝒇𝒇𝒇𝒇 7 2 - - - - 
Total 49 6 9 1 2 1 
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SubBytes and inverse SubBytes. For multiple stuck-at 
errors, a 96% fault coverage resulted, which covers 48 
nodes that were identified from the 50 injected nodes in 
both the S-box and the inverse S-box.  Table 3 represents 
the fault coverage for single and multiple stuck-at errors for 
the S-box and inverse S-box. 
 
Table 3: Fault coverage for fault detection scheme 
 
Faults Fault coverage 
(%) 
Single stuck-at errors 99.9 
Multiple stuck-at errors 96 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 In this paper, the new fault detection scheme, 
based on parity bits, has been developed for the S-box/ Inv 
S-box architecture. It has been shown that the proposed 
fault detection scheme, using the new optimum composite 
field S-box/ InvS-box, has lower complexities and delay 
overheads than other previous designs. Based on the 
simulation results, high fault coverage was obtained for the 
proposed fault detection scheme. This scheme also offers 
low hardware complexities, which leads to a low cost and 
low power design estimated about 20uW. 
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